From: Asymptotics of fingerprinting and group testing: capacity-achieving log-likelihood decoders
Fingerprinting attack | Simple decoding | Joint decoding |
---|---|---|
\(\vec {\theta }_{\text {int}}\): interleaving attack | \(\ell \sim 2 c^{2} \ln n\) | \(\ell \sim 2c^{2} \ln n\) |
\(\vec {\theta }_{\text {all1}}\): all-1 attack | \(\ell \sim \frac {c \ln n}{(\ln 2)^{2}}\) | \(\ell \sim c \log _{2} n\) |
\(\vec {\theta }_{\text {maj}}\): majority voting | \(\ell \sim \pi c \ln n\) | \(\ell \sim c \log _{2} n\) |
\(\vec {\theta }_{\text {min}}\): minority voting | \(\ell \sim \frac {c \ln n}{(\ln 2)^{2}}\) | \(\ell \sim c \log _{2} n\) |
\(\vec {\theta }_{\text {coin}}\): coin-flip attack | \(\ell \sim \frac {4 c \ln n}{(\ln 2)^{2}}\) | \(\ell \sim c \log _{5/4} n\) |