Attack | Applicability | Effects | Countermeasures |
---|---|---|---|
PU emulation | CR networks based on non-cooperative schemes. Note: in such environments an attack against a specific SU may only affect that SU. | False alarms due to fake signals. | Sensing techniques that consider a priori known characteristics of the legitimate PU signals. |
The affected SUs are denied access to the affected spectrum holes due to greedy or malicious motivations, and, therefore, their performances are likely to decrease. | |||
Solutions based on capabilities such as location determination techniques and access to geo-location information about a priori known PUs. | |||
Spectrum sensing data manipulation/falsification | CR networks based on cooperative schemes. Note: in such environments, attacks against a single SU may affect several SUs or the entire network. | Cooperative spectrum sensing accuracy decreases due to the propagation of false alarms and/or missed detections that are forged. | Solutions for providing characteristics such as mutual authentication, data integrity, and data encryption. |
 |  | If learning is considered, the behavior of the SUs is likely to suffer a negative impact on the long-term basis due to the usage of manipulated data in the learning process. | Outlier detection techniques. |
 |  | Malicious attacks may impact on PUs by inducing missed detections. | Approaches based on the exploration of spectrum spatial correlation and location techniques. |
 |  | Malicious and greedy attacks may impact the performance of the SUs by inducing false alarms. | Schemes that enable determining the trustiness of the SUs and, therefore, dropping reports from untrustworthy sources. |
 |  | Deployment of dedicated trusty sensors. | |
 |  | Usage of mechanisms to selectively forget past information in order to make beliefs and learning outputs temporary. |