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Table 1 Wireless DoS attacks prevention schemes

From: Protected control packets to prevent denial of services attacks in IEEE 802.11 wireless networks

Authors Method Strategy Weaknesses
Rachedi and Benslimane (2008) [1] Cryptographic Add transmitter address to CTS and ACK packets; authentication using hmac-MD5 or hmac-sha1 of 80-160b The model is incapable of preventing replay attacks and contention-free DoS attacks
Khan and Hasan (2008) [2] Cryptographic Change CRC-32 to CRC-16 and use PRF-16 from hmac-sha1 The model has three drawbacks: modifying CRC which is used for all other types of packets, short security field, and inability to prevent replay attacks
Bicakci and Tavli (2009) [3] Cryptographic Symmetric algorithm to encrypt/hash function to authenticate the CP The model does not specify the symmetric encryption or authentication algorithms
Qureshi et al. (2008) [19] Cryptographic Encryption using PRF-160 bits The model only protects polling CP while still DoS attacks are possible using other types of CP
Chen et al. (2007) [20] Detection DoS attacks detection using CUSUM The model only detects RTS and CTS DoS attacks while incapable of detecting DoS using other CP. Besides it is unable to prevent the DoS attacks
Sugantha and Shanmugavel (2006, 2005) [21, 22] Detection Keep track of statistical distribution pattern of CP when a uniform pattern only belongs to attacker The model provides only detection while unable to prevent the DoS attacks
Zhang et al. (2008) [23] Detection ENAV to give enough time to sender of data fame to receive ACK packet The model only protects ACK packet while DoS attack is possible by other types of CP
Negi and Rajeswaran (2005) [24] Validation Introduce a new packet called CTSR to revoke the NAV if no data is sensed after RTS or CTS transmission Unprotected new CTSR frame causes a new DoS attacks itself. Besides, the model is not able to prevent DoS attacks using other types of CP
Chen et al. (2003) [25] Validation Two timers as RTS-DATA and CTS-ACK to check reception of data and ACK packets, respectively The model is incapable of preventing DoS attacks using contention-free CP
Bellardo and Savage (2003) [26] Validation Place limit on duration value of CP: ACK duration must be zero, discarding RTS if data frames is not sensed, ignoring isolated CTS packets The model does not specify prevention of contention-free DoS attacks. Besides ignoring CTS packets while they may belong to hidden nodes can significantly degrade wireless network performance